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SPEECH
OF

MR. STILES, OF GEORGIA,
ON

THE RIGHT OF PETITION.
In the House of Stepresenta&nes, Janueiry
30, it sprung from our own soil, it was btit the “ignis
1844—On the motion of Mr. Black, of Georgia, fatuus” which would expire when the gas which
to amend the motion of Mr. Dromgoole, of Vir gave it" origin had been consumed; or, if dropped by
ginia, to recommit the report of the Select Com some foreign hand, either by accident or design,
mittee on the Rules, by instructing them to report that there was no combustible matter within its
reach, and that it must be exitinguished by the first
to the House the following rule, (the 25th) viz:
“No petition, memorial, resolution,or other paper breath which swept over it. But time has proven
graying the abolition of slavery in the District of the fallacy of these calculations. The spark which’
Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave dropped fell amidst inflammable materials; and the
ctrade between the States or Territories of the United breath which it was supposed would extinguish,
States in which it now exists, shall be received by only enkindled the flame. It has shot with terrific
rapidity through the land. Stopped neither by
the House, or entertained in any way whatever.
patriotism, principle, or party, it is now causing the
January 28.
very elements of our constitution to “melt with fer
Mr. STlLES>having obtained the floor, spoke as vent heat;” and will, if not arrested by us in this
hall, prove to our country its “last great conflagra
follows:
tion.”
Mr. Speaker: Of all the evils which beset our
The question now before the House, which in
•government, of all the dangers which threaten our volves this important subject, is, in substance, the
Union, not one <$n be l&ind, more speedy in its op retention or rejection of the 25th rule, providing for
eration, sure m its consequences, or fatal in its re the exclusion of abolition petitions. Being in favor
sults, than foreign interference with the domestic in of retaining the rule, I shall consider, with the lim
stitutions of the South. Other divisions between the ited opportunity that the hour rule allows, the objec
citizens of this wide-spread republic, which consti tions to such a course. Those objections consist,
tute the groundwork of opposing parties, and whose as the opponents of the rule contend, in its being a
violence at times seems almost to hazard the exist violation of the constitution, and an abridgment of
ence of the country, are but honest differences of the right of petition. What part of the constitu
construction as to to the powers of the government. tion does it violate, and upon what part do
This variety of opinion is but consistent with the the opponents of the rule rest? I am answered,
variety of interest, education, and habit, by which the first amendment. And what does the first
we arc distinguished. It is wholesome, because it amendment prescribe? That “.Congress shall
is a difference based in reason, having for its com make no law abridging the right of the people
mon object the support of the constitution; for its peaceably to assemble, and to petition the gov
end, the preservation of the liberties of the country. ernment for a redress of grievances.” To analyze
But far different are such divisions, from that which the clause: first, Congress shall make no law. Con
separates the true lover of his country from that gress has made no law; this is but one branch of the
band of deluded fanatics, whose only reason is that government, and it can make no law. Congress does
“the end will justify the means,” and which end is not propose to make a law. But it has been said
the desolation of the fairest regions of the earth, the that the rule accomplishes the same object—it
destruction of the most perfect system of social and abridges the right of petition; it violates the spirt
political happiness which has ever existed.
and intent of the constitution. The letter of the
The danger is not only great, but it is increasing. constitution, it cannot be denied, is not violated by
The spirit of abolition has advanced, and is ad the rule; and before it*can be violated, some law,
vancing. It increases by opposition; it triumphs by some legislative enactment to that effect must be
defeat. Scarcely ten years ago, and the few obscure passed by Congress. But the spirit and intent of
enthusiasts of the North, who advocated the aboli of the constitution: let us look to that. To discover
tion of slavery at the South, excited but the deri this, we must refer to its history. What is ths
sion and contempt of the whole country. Aboli history of the first amendment, and from whence
tion was deemed by the enlightened and reflecting was it derived? This point having been fully dis
citizen but an insignificant and eicldy flame; that, if cussed, and the acta relative to the subject read by
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the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. Rhett,] to the period referred to by that gentleman—1668;
and subsequently by the member from Alabama, but extending from that time down to 1795, com
[Mr. Belser,] I may here be permitted to be mencing Hatsell, p. 166, as follows:.
brief, and to content myself with stating simply the
“9th April, 1894, petition against duties on tonnage
conclusions to which history irresistibly leads. Not rejected.
to go father back in point of time, it is sufficient to
“28th April, 1698, petition against duties on pit coal
state that in the thirteenth year of the reign of rejected.
Charles II, an act of Parliament was passed abridg
“29th and 30th June, 1698, petition against duties
ing the right of the people peaceably to assemble on Scotch linens and whale fins rejected.
and petition for a redress of grievances. This act
“5th January, 1703, petition against duties on malt
created great and universal dissatisfaction among liquor rejected.
the people, in prohibiting them from assembling,
“21st December, 1706, Resolved, That the house
preventing their petitioning, and punishing with in will receive no petition for any sum relating to the
carceration all who attempted its infringement. The public service but what is recommended by the
oppressive operation of the riot acts being sensibly crown.
felt in this country about the time of the formation
“11th June, 1713, this is declared to be a standing
of the constitution, and the obnoxious statute of order of the house.
Charles II being still of force here, led to the adop
“23d April, 1713, Resolved, That the house will re
tion of the first amendment of the constitution.
ceive no petition for compounding debts, &c.
“it was the right of the people to assemble and peti
“25th March, 1715, this is declared the standing
tion” which they held most sacred, and to the in order of the house.
vasion of which they seemed most strongly op
“8th March, 1732, a petition being offered against
posed. ' It was this subject, and not the reception of a bill depending for securing the trade of the sugar
petitions, that elicited the thrilling eloquence of Fox colonies, it was refused to be brought up. A motion
to which the gentleman from North Carolina allu was then made that a committee be appointed to
ded. It was his opposition to “the proclamations of search precedents in relation to the receiving, or not
1795” against seditious meetings. It was because receiving, petitions against the imposing of duties;
the liberty to assemble was considered the more im and the question being put, it passed in the negative.
portant right, that Fox contended for it, instead of “28th January, 1760, a petition against duties on
for the reception of petitions; and not for the reason malt liquor being offered, on motion ‘that it b«
Btated, that the “proposition to receive petitions was brought up,’ it passed in the negative, nem. con.
never at that time disputed.” Let me tell that hon
“15th February, 1765, a petition from Virginia,
orable gentleman, and also the member from New Connecticut, and Carolina, against the bill imposing
York, [Mr. Beardsley.,] who stated that Parliament a stamp duty in America being offered, upon ques
never rejected petitions, that the “proposition was tion of its ‘being brought up,’ it passed in the neg
ut that time never disputed” that Parliament was ative.
possessed of, and exercised fully the right of re
“On the 1st July, 1789, a petition pf newsmen
ceiving or rejecting petitions at pleasure.
against a bill for granting additional stamp duties on
But the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. newspapers, being offered, it was passed in the neg
Winthrop,] not content with mere assertion, has ative.
endeavored to sustain the position by reference to
“On the 4th of March, 1189, a petition of certain
authority.
importers and dealers in foreign wines, praying
But although assertion, in matters of law or pre against an augmentation of duties, on motion ‘that
cedent, is the feeblest and most unsatisfactory aid the petition be brought up,’ it passed in the negowhich can be invoked, yet, from the result of his ef tive, nem. con.”
fort, it is but too perceptible that those who pro I am authorized, then, in stating, that Parliament
ceeded him, and who relied upon assertion alone, was not only in the practice of rejecting petitions,
pursued at least the more politic and prudent course. but, by resolution, of excluding whole classes of
After a laborious search (I have no doubt) through them; and that, too, upon the matter of taxation—of
Hatsell’s work upon parliamentary precedents, he all others the most important to the subject, and one
has succeeded in discovering a single sentence which upon which the right of petition should be held,
seemed to sustain his point; and it is not surprising most sacred.
that he should have grasped at it with the avidity The course proposed to be pursued by the oppo
which he manifested, and to have desired for nents of the rule, viz: that of receiving all petitions;
it the enviable distinction of a golden inscription up is not sustained by parliamentary practice; but as
on upon the pillars of this hall. This sentence, the we are referred by the gentleman from New York,'
mere dictum of the author, is in opposition to the [Mr. B.] “for instruction to England”—(instruction
practice of Parliament, as manifested in almost eve in humanity and liberty, I suppose,)-—let us look be
ry page of the work, and contradicted even by the yond the acts to the motives of Parliament. Let us
sentences which immediately precede and immedi see how the reasoning of the opponents of this rule
ately follow it. (Mr. S. here read the passage corresponds with that of Parliament in the rejection
relied on by the gentleman from Massachusetts, of petitions.
Hatsell, page 206, after laying down the rule by
and the ones immediately before and after it.)
By the preceding sentence, then, the “practice of which petitions were rejected, states: “The princi
refusing petitions” is clearly, acknowledged; whilst, ple upon which this rule was adopted appears to be
by the subsequent one, the “declining to receive a this: that a tax extending, in its effect, over every
part of the kingdom, and more or less affecting
petition” is “not considered as a hardship.
From a hasty examination of the work introduced every individual, and in its nature necessarily and
by the gentleman from Massachusetts himself, (and intentionally imposing a burden upon the people, it
as to the merits of which I will not dissent from the can answer no end or purpose whatever, for any set
hf^h eulogium he has pronounced upon it,) I find a of petitioners to state these consequences as a griev
continued practice of rejecting petitions not confined ance to die House.” Now, how do the opponents

of this rule reason? An institution (slavery) “ex tary Precedents that petitions against taxes were re
tending in its effect” not beyond the slaveholding jected by Parliament. Now, sir, as we are referred
States, “affecting” no one out of those limits, and to England for the rule of our conduct, upon what
in its nature “imposing” no “burdens upon the peo principle was it that petitions against taxes were
ple,” yet it may “answer” an “end” and a “pur always rejected in England ’ It was that taxes were
pose” for “a set of petitioners to state” the institu necessary for the support of government. But I
tion “as a grievance to the House.” Again, in the ask, sir, if nothing besides taxes are necessary for
next sentence, “the House of Commons, before the. support of government'1 Are not national faith
they come to a resolution which imposes a tax, can and national honor necessary for the support of gov
not but know that it may sensibly affect the com ernment’ Can any government in the world last a mo
merce or manufacture on which the duty is laid; but ment without them? Can dollars and cents be placed
they. cannot permit the inconvenience that in the scale against faith and honor? Are not the
may possibly be brought upon a particular faith and honor of the nation pledged upon the sub
branch of trade, to weigh with them when put ject of slavery? Would the slaveholding States
in the balance with those advantages which are in ever have entered the Union—would our southern
tended to result to the whole, and which the public fathers ever have signed the constitution, unless
necessities of the state demand from them.” How, their rights had been secured by that instrument’
in this regard, do the advocates of reception reason Will not that Union be dissolved, whenever the
here? That Congress cannot but know that slavery, government shall, instead of' protecting, plunder
which does not “sensibly affect commerce or manu them of their property? Yes, sir, slavery and the
factures,” nor impair any “particular branch of trade,” constitution have flourished together; their existence
yet will permit the fanaticism which alone opposesit is the same, and inseparable; and if folly and mad
“to weigh with them, when put in the balance with ness shall destroy the one, the other will follow it to
those advantages which are intended to result to the whole, he tomb; But to return to the argument from which
and which the public necessities of the state demand of I have deviated, to reply to the gentleman from
them.”
Massachusetts. Parliament, I have shown,- were in
. In other words, the opponents of this rule reason the constant practice of rejecting petitions. The intel
that, in England, although ■ the petitioners are bur ligent framers of the constitution were familiar with
dened with taxation even to poverty and want, their this fact; and in guarding our country against the
petitions must be rejected; while in America, where evils of such legislation as the riot acts, in protecting
petitioners are burdened with nothing but their own the great right of petition, their omission .to provide
sickly sensibilities, their petitions must be received, that petitions should be received, is evidence irresist
notwithstanding they pray for the destruction of a ible and conclusive, that the reception of petitions
constitution from which they derive unparalleled was never intended to be embraced in the amend
liberty and happiness. And what is still more ment, or comprehended under the right of petition.
strange, the rejection of the- former ‘(according to According to the letter of the- constitution, this
the position of the gentleman from Massachusetts) rule is not a violation of that instrument, be
is no infringement of the right of petition, while cause no law is passed, or contemplated. Ac
a rejection of the latter is a total annihilation of this cording to its spirit, it is not violated, because
the object of the amendment was simply to
great “inherent and inalienable right.”
The most objectionable feature of this “odious prevent the passage of such acts as those of
rule,” (as he is pleased to term it,) the gentleman George 1st, and Charles 2d; and because the practice
from Massachusetts thinks, is that which under of rejecting petitions was common in England,
takes “to prescribe the subjects upon which the peo familiar to the authors of the amendment, atid not
ple may or may not petition.” This feature he de provided against by them. It is not a violation of the
nounces as being “at war with the constitution, and constitution, then. Is it a violation of the right
of petition? E ut, instead of searching the constitu
in opposition to all parliamentary rule.”
The rule contended for only prescribes that peti tion, in order o ascertain what are the rights of pe
tions aimed against the constitution shall not be re tition, strange t j tell, we must, as the gentleman
ceived. That such a feature is not at war with the from New York says, throw the constitution aside,
constitution, I will soon attempt to show; but at hnd go back to England, to the British Parliament,
present, while upon parliamentary practice, I would to the bill of rights, which grew out of the reyolu-,
inquire whether such a feature, even to the extent tion of 1688. A citizen of America, the freest coun
for which the gentleman contends, is “in opposition try in the world, (as the gentleman from North
to air parliamentary rule.” Not to proceed farther, Carolina observed;) run away from his own country,
the very parliamentary rule to which I have had oc and flee to England for his freedom! I leave the
casion to refer provides that petitions against duties gentleman from New York to reconcile himself
shall not be received. Now, I ask the gentleman with the gentleman from North Carolina, his associate
from Massachusetts whether that7is not an under in feeling on this subject. I leave him to explain
taking, on the part of Parliament, “to prescribe the to that member how it is that a citizen of the freest
subject upon which the people may or may not pe country in the world can throw aside the constitu
tition.”
tion of his country, and seek a cover for his rights,
[Here the Speaker announced that the morning a shelter for his liberties, behind the acts'of a British
Parliament.
hour had expired.]
But why should we go back for instruction to
January 30,
England? as the gentleman from New York said.
The report of the Select Committee on the Rules Is there any analogy between either the government
again coming up—
or the people of England and our own? In England
Mr.' STILES resumed and concluded his re all power is in the government. Here it is in the
marks, as follows:
people. There the Parliament, humanly speaking,
_ When I last addressed the House, before conclu is omnipotent. Here, our Congress is limited in its
ding-, I had shown, by reference io Hatsell’e parliamen powets to a few specified subjects, marked out and

defined by a written-constitution. In Great Britain,
the sovereign holds his office'independent of the
people; and so do the members of the House of
Lords. If arbitrary and unjust laws are instituted
by the government, the people, however unanimous
against them, have no remedy but in an humble pe
tition for their abolition. Here the members of the
governrhent are directly responsible to the people,
hold their officers subject to the popular will, and, if
unfaithful to their trusts, they are turned out, and
more faithful servants chosen in their places. It
results, therefore, that whilst, in monarchical gov
ernments, the right to petition the rulers is the high
est, or ultimate right of. the subject in securing him
from molestation at the hands of his government,
here the right dwindles into comparative insignifi
cance; being only a right to petition our own ser
vants to do that which we may command them to
do, or discharge them'for not doing. In short, in
England the people are listened to only when they
speak in the humble tone of petition. In America
they will be heard, through the authoritative voice of’
instruction.
What does this right of petition embrace? What
would they have? The right peaceably to assemble.
Do we propose, to disturb that right’ No. The
right to prepare a petition. Do we propose to pre
vent them? No. The right to present that petition
to this body. Dq we oppose that right’ No, sir, the
question has not been fairly met. Gentlemen argue
as though we denied the right of petition. We
make no such denial. We are as warm advocates
of the right of petition as any persons on this floor.
We know the importance of that right, and would
not touch it. We are willing that gentlemen shall
exercise the right to as full an extent, at least, as it
is enjoyed in England, (for that seems to be the
summit of their ambition;) but we come to issue
with them as to the limits and extent of that right.
What are the limits and extent of that right’ There
must be some point at which the right of petition
ends, and that of legislating by this body commences.
Where does the right of petition end? Just where
that of legislation commences. Legislation cannot
go back and interfere with petition; nor can petition
extend forward and interfere with legislation. The
light of legislation commences the moment the
House is informed of the petition. If they have a
right to go one step farther, and say we shall re
ceive,* they have just as much right to say we shall
refer, and we shall grant. The action of the House
—the right of legislation—commences with the pre
sentation of the petition; and the refusal to accept is
no interference with that right. We do not propose
to interfere with their assembling; we do not dic
tate the manner in which they shall prepare a peti
tion, or how they should present it to this body.
But, when they have assembled; when they have
prepared the petition; when they have presented it
to this House, when, in short, their right has been
fully exercised and completely exhausted,—then it
is that our right commences: and, as we have not
interfered with them, we should not permit them to
interfere with us, to usurp the legislative powers
of the country, and dictate to us the mode and man
ner in which our duties shall be performed.
But, (says the gentleman from North Carolina,)
the petition should be received, “in order to know
what it is the petitioners want.’’ We undertake,
(says the member from Maine,) by the . refusal of
the petition, “to prejudge the case,” and “condemn
them unheard.”

Here is another step where gentlemen reason un
fairly. They assume, as a starting point upon which
to found an argument, that we have never seen,
read, or heard the petition, .Now, Sir, if this bet
reasoning, gentlemen have forgotten the very first
rule in logic. They have failed to prove their prem
ises. Is it true, in point of fact, that we are unac- x
quainted with the objects of the petition? Is there a
member here who can rise in his place and say
that he does “not know what the petitioners want’’’
Have they not been presented beyond number for
years past’ Has not Congress heard, considered,
discussed, and determined, that they cannot enter
tain jurisdiction of the subject? And'yet it impairs
the great right of petition, it treats the applicant dis
respectfully, for Congress, by this rule, to assert
that they have heard and determined that they have
no jurisdiction over the subject. Will gentlemen
inform me upon what principles such an answer—
the judgment of the House as to its jurisdiction (for'
that is the whole sum and substance of the rule)—
can be construed into disrespect towards the peti
tioners?
Let gentlemen consider such conduct, if it had oc
curred in private instead of public life. An individ
ual presents you with a petition to-day, and you in-form him that you have no power to grant his pray
er; to-morrdw he renews his application, and re
ceives the same answer; but, not satisfied with re
fusal after refusal, he continues to harass you with
his applications, until, at length, worn out by his im
portunities, you adopt a rule that you will not, in
future, receive his applications; will any one, the
most fastidious, say that the adoption of such a
rule is treating the petitioner with- disrespect’ But
step above the walks of private life, and enter the
places of power: and is the principle- of action
changed? Visit your courts of law: you find a plain
tiff has brought an action for an amount, or of a na
ture, beyond or out of thejurisdiction of the court. A
plea is filed: what is the reply of the judge? The
court has no jurisdiction of the case. Has such
an answer ever been considered as disrespectful? Go
still higher: enter the courts of chancery. A com
plainant has filed a bill which, taking every word of
it to be true, presents no case for relief; a demurrer
is offered by the defendant, which, admitting all that
the bill alleges, denies his right to come into court;
and the chancellor sustaining - the demurrer, dis
misses the complainant without proof or inquiry. ‘
Has such a course ever been deemed as wanting m
respect? and is the legislative power of the country
to be stripped of a like authority? This rule is in
the nature of a simple plea to the jurisdiction or de
murrer in chancery;- and can no more be coupled
with disrespect than either of those modes of judi
cial proceeding.
But “we prejudge the case.” “We condemn
them unheard.” What do gentlemen mean? Am
I to understand that the petitions have never been
read? They have been read over and over again,
whilst before the question of reception is put, the-,
petition can always be read upon the call of any,
member of the House. Is it meant, by not being'*
heard, that these petitions have never been discussed?
They have been discussed in this hall to. the fullest
extent for weeks, and even months, whilst the ques
tion of reception not only admit discussion, but ad
mits it in the most ample manner.
.Gentlemen argue as though we had no right, for
any cause, or under any circumstances, to reject a
petition. Is the right illimitable? : Are there no'
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■bounds to its exercise? If so, we might as well stop guaranties the existence of slavery, Both rights ,
business. -If the indefinable grievances of every are
_ ’ equally'
---- -----------J 1—
*’—
secured
by the ----same 1high authority.
'man, woman, and child—white, black, or parti-’ Can one portion of the constitution be used to de
colored, throughout our widely extended country, stroy another? Could the framers of the constitu
whose digestive organs may have become impaired, tion have been guilty of such an absurdity as to
-and who has therefore “the thousand ills that flesh is have given the people a right to petition against the
'heir to,” to complain of; if the conceits of every instrument which they had formed for their welfare
fanatic or fool, when embodied in the form of a pe and happiness? Can they be chargeable with the
tition, are entitled, on that account alone, to consid- folly of creating and sanctioning a grievance, when
sideration and respect—we might devote our whole they have conferred the right of petitioning against
time of legislation to petitions alone; we might re such evils? In short, can anything in the constitu
main here from one year’s end to another; we tion be considered such a grievance as the people
might sit from morn to night, and night to morn, are allowed to petition against? No, sir: by no
and. pur labors would never know an end; The sane and unprejudiced man can the existence of
right illimitable? Is every petition, however disre slavery be considered a grievance in the contempla
spectful to this body, to be received? Is there tion of the constitution.
any one who, in his zeal for the freedom of pe
But again. Whose grievances does the constitu
tition, goes that far? I presume not. There is, tion contemplate should be the subject of petition?then, some limit to that right. We have the power to Certainly those of the petitioners—the grievances
reject; the right to refuse is conceded. And is not this of the petitioners themselves, and not those of any
rejection an abridgment of the great right of peti other body or person. Will any gentleman on this?
tion? Oh no! And why? Because it would be an floor attempt to show how slavery at the South is a
interference with the dignity of our honorable selves, grievance to the people of the -North. How,can.
. and be perhaps an interruption of the business of hey ask us to consider as a grievance that which.,
this House. This great inherent and inalienable those who are alone concerned neither know nor ac
right cannot stand, then, when brought into contact knowledge? There are those, doubtless, at the
with our dignity or our business. These are to be North, if not in this hall, who look upon slavery in
rejected; but all others are to be received. These the abstract as an evil; but is it therefore a griev
petitions may be as disrespectful as their authors ance? I call upon any constitutional lawyer on thisplease, to our constituents or our States; but so as floor, and more especially the strict constructionist,
“they do not touch our noble selves, they are to be to say’that it is such a grievance as was contem-’
received. They may treat with contempt the con plated by the authors of the 1st amendment of the
stitution of the country, and trample on its chartered constitution,
. .
rights; but so as they do not impede our business
2. The power of the government over the subject
here, they are to be received. From whence did we of the petition.
What is the object which petitioners profess to
-obtain our dignity? Are we in a monarchical gov
ernment, and was it born with us? No, sir. It was have in view in the presentation of petitions? What
derived from the people; yet we would reject a peti is the end to be attained, and upon which Congress
tion here, disrespectful to ourselves, who are the can alone recognise their right of application? It is re
■servants; but receive one insulting to, and defama dress. And a grievance which Congress has no right to
tory of, the people, who are the masters. Whence redress, they have no right to petition against;
do we derive our powers of legislation? From the because grievances which Congress can redress are
-constitution; and we would reject a petition im the grievances, and the only grievances, contemplated,
peding our legislation, and yet receive one viola- in the amendment.
Now, if there is a single constitutional principle
rive of the constitution, front whence all our powers
•of legislation are derived, an’d upon which the wel which, more than any other, may be considered as
fare of the country depends. The right illimitable? settled beyond the possibilty of dispute, it is that the
Then where the necessity of that rule of this institution of slavery is municipal, not national. It
House which makes it incumbent on the introducer belongs exclv sively to the States, and can only be
to give a statement of the contents of the petition? effected by State legislation.
This domestic institution of the South is her
Where the necessityof a statement, unless its ob
ject be to determine whether or not Congress has own. It was brought into the Union with her;
jurisdiction over the subject. If there be no dis secured by the compact which makes us one people;
cretion, where the necessity of that other rule which and he who looks upon it as a grievance is an enemy
requires the question of reception to be put. Where to the constitution, and opposed to the peace and
the necessity of a question at all, if we are pro prosperity of our common country.
I have thus attempted to show that slavery is not
hibited from voting, or answering in the negative?
The right of petition involves two considerations: a grievance. If it were a grievance at all, it is not
1st. The right of the citizen aggrieved to petition: one affecting the people of the North; and that, if it
2d. The power of the government over the subject were a grievance affecting the people of the North,
of the petition.
it is not one which can be redressed by the govern
1. Then the citizen must be aggrieved, before he ment; and therefore no one has a constitutional right,
can petition.
to petition for its abolition. A petition to any per
The only petitions excluded by this rule are those son or authority presupposes the power of relief. A
upon the subject of slavery. Is a majority of this right of petition cannot exist where there is no dutyHouse prepared to pronounce slavery a grievance? to hear the complaint; and the duty to hear cannot
Can an institution recognised and secured by the exist without a comment urat 3 power to redress.
constitution be a grievance? Are they prepared to There is, then, no duty to receive a petition upon
pronounce the constitution (for it is the constitution) which Congress has indisputably no power to act;
a grievance? Was it the intention of the constitu and the refusal to receive such petition cannot be.
tion to entail grievances on the people? The same tortured into a violation of the right to send it, which
constitution which guaranties the right of petition never existed.
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Many points have been made on this question
■which I could have desired an opportunity to have
met, but which, under the operation of the hour
rule, I am reluctantly constrained to omit. Were
it not for this abridgment of my great inherent and
inalienable right, “freedom of speech” and of debate,
I should have made it my duty to have replied to
every suggestion which has been advanced; for
there is not one, which I have heard, which could
not, in my opinion, have been easily and trium
phantly answered. But although deprived of this
great right, I shall not, like some gentlemen on this
floor, flee to England for my right; or, like others,
speak of dissolving the Union. I will not even
waste my important time in the indulgence of com
plaint, but with all possible despatch proceed to an
swer such as I conceive the most important sug
gestions.
It is said on this floor, “let the petitions be re
ceived, and they will vote with us for their rejection
immediately after reception.” To such I say, there
is one point in which we agree; and that the most
important of the whole matter. It is in the refusal
or denial of the prayer of the petition. Reception
is all that divides us. But I ask, does not reception
carry with it jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the petition? Does not reception carry the implica
tion, inevitably, that the petition may or may not be
granted? Reception either carries the implication, or
it does not. The proposition must be answered af
firmatively or negatively. If it be answered affirmatively, if the reception carries jurisdiction over the
subject of slavery, if it carries the implication that
the prayer for its abolition may or may not be grant
ed, are they willing to stand forth as the advocates
of reception? Clearly not; because, in the outset,
they agree that the prayer could not be granted, be
cause, if Congress would, she has not the power to
grant it. If, then, reception carries jurisdiction, they
aye opposed to it. If, on the other hand, the propo
sition be answered negatively, if reception does not
carry jurisdiction and the implication that the prayer
may or may not be granted, where is the use of it?
Where the difference between reception, and instant
rejection after it is received? What is to be
gained by reception? Is it any advantage to
the petitioner that his prayer is rejected immedi
ately after, instead of immediately before, reception.
How does the simple, naked vote of reception bene
fit him? The' prayer of a petition is its vital part;
take away the prayer, and you deprive it of all vi
tality—make it a dead letter. If, therefore, we reject
the prayer, do we not reject the petition? The dis
tinction is too refined and abstract for a question of
such universal and vital importance. It is but a dis
pute about terms, and wholly overlooks the sub
stance. It is at first and at last a rejection of the
prayer of the petition; but a refusal of the petition is
a rejection in a mode to save time and money, put an
end to such applications, and prevent discussions
dangerous to the Union.
The gentleman from New York has admitted
that when petitions asked Congress to interfere be
tween master and slave in the States, they stood on
ground prohibited by the constitution; but went on
to argue that petitions should be received when they
asked an abolition of slavery in the District, because
“Congress had full power to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia.” “They may pay the master
or not, but they can take the slave compulsorily
from him.” I have not the time, if I possessed the
inclination, to argue this point. It does not neces

sarily arise in meeting the question upon which gen
tlemen have laid most stress in the debate—viz: an
abridgment of the petition: but, as the opinion is
asserted with so much confidence, and in such wild
terms, I will throw out a few difficulties in the way,
which have occurred to my mind, and which I think
are calculated to stagger any reflecting man. “Con
gress may pay the master or not, but it can take
compulsorily the slave from him;” and the only au
thority for this sweeping and despotic declaration is
simply that clause which gives to Congress “exclu
sive legislation” over the District. Sir, did the ces
sions by Virginia and Maryland of portions of their
respective territory to Congress to constitute the
District, remove the inhabitants of those portions
beyond the guaranties of the constitution? Clearly
not. How, then, does the gentleman propose to
get rid of that portion of the 5th amendment of the
constitution, which provides that “no person shall
be deprived of life,'liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law; and that private property shall not
be taken for public use without due compensation?”
That the legislation of this hall is not a “process of
law” will not be disputed, and it is equally clear that
slaves are “property;” they are recognised as prop
erty by the constitution, claimed as property by our
treaties with foreign powers, and considered asproperty by our acts of legislation. Again “private
property shall not be taken (except) for public use.’*'
It would be somewhat difficult, I apprehend, to estab
lish that the emancipation of the slaves of thia
District would be for the “public use,” and benefit;
and should they be so considered, could they be
taken “compulsorily” from the master “with or
without paying” him, as the gentleman from New
York says? No, sir, not “without due compensa
tion.” And when the member has disposed of these,
difficulties, under what clause of the constitution will
he derive funds to be appropriated to such an object?
We are told that “Congress has exclusive legislaj|
tion over” the “District;” but does “exclusive” mean
unlimited—“absolute?” as the gentleman from Ma’ssachusetts, [Mr. Hudson] says? From what dictiona
ry or other source did he learn that “exclusive”
meant “absolute?” And yet it must not only signify
absolute, but also despotic power, or the • posi
tion of the gentleman from New York falls to the
ground. But how will any reasonable man (not to
take a constitutional lawyer) construe that clause?
It means, and can be made to signify nothing more
than a grant of legislative power over the District
to the exclusion, “in all cases whatsoever,” of any
concurrent jurisdiction. If this most palpable con
struction needed support, the history of the clause
would amply furnish it. That clause of the 8th
section of the 1 st article was not comprised in the
original draft of the constitution, but it was afterwards supplied, when its necessity became apparent,
from the circumstances which occurred during the
latter part of the revolutionary war, when the pro
ceedings of Congress were disturbed by a turbulent,
mob, which the police of Philadelphia being unable
to subdue, compelled that body to remove its sittings
to Trenton, New Jersey. That power was conferred
for the single purpose of enabling Congress to pro
tect its members from insult and violence, and to
conduct, without interruption, the deliberations of
this country. From whence did Congress derive
its powers of legislation over this District’ From
the constitution, together with the “cessions of par
ticular States.” Could the cessions of territory by
particular States have enlarged the powers of Con—

gress under the constitution? Surely not. How
then can she now presume to abolish slavery? The
power of Congress over the subject of slavery is
fixed by the constitution. It has no power what
ever over the subject, and cannot touch it, whether
the slave be found upon the soil of a State, or that
of the District of Columbia. From what States was
the “ten miles square,” which now constitutes the
“seat of government,” derived? Virginia and Mary
land. It is a self-evident proposition, as well as an es■ ablished principle of law, that a grantee can acquire
no more power than a grantor could convey. The
States of Virginia and Maryland themselves, it can
not be disputed, could not have liberated, without
the consent of their owners, the slaves of this
District, when the territory was parts of their
respective States. And how then can Congress,
deriving her power from them, claim or exer
cise more power than the States which ceded
the territory ever possessed? But those States, un
willing to rely upon the general principle just allu
ded to, and apprehending the very danger which
now threatens the rights of the inhabitants of this
District, prudently inserted in their acts of cession
the following limit to the exercise of power by Con
gress over the District:
“Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
be construed to vest in the United States any right
..of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of in
dividuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or
may be transferred by such individuals to the Uni
ted States.”
But there are other principles which should gov
ern legislators in this matter—principles of higher
authority and obligation than even those of the law
and constitution. I mean the great principles ofjus
tice and moral right.
Would the States of Virginia and Maryland ever,
have consented to relinquish portions of their terri
tory for such purposes as those for which gentlemen
now contend? Would the independent citizens of
“free and independent States” ever have agreed to
have exchanged a legislation over their personal
rights, by representatives chosen by, and responsi
ble to them, for the exclusive legislation of a Con
gress irresponsible to them, if they had supposed
that such jurisdiction was to be unlimited, “abso
lute," and liable to be directed by the petitions of
others, who had neither a common residence nor a
common interest with them? Does any one believe
that, if the federal government had intimated an
intention to abolish slavery in the District, the
States of Virginia and Maryland would ever have
ceded their territory? And is not such an attempt
now in bad faith, against the spirit of the compact,
.and a gross violation of the understanding which
must have subsisted between the parties to the ces
sion? But, if I were disposed to argue this point, I
should need nothing more than the admission of the
gentleman from New York, that “Congress cannot
interfere with slavery in the States.” Will not the
abolition of slavery in this District be an interfer
ence with slavery in the States? Not to take into
consideration the real object which the abolitionists
have in view, in their designs upon this District, as
but an entering-wedge for the abolition of slavery
throughout the States, as but the commencement of
an enterprise which will terminate only with entire
emancipation,—not, I say, to consider these objects,
will it not “interfere with slavery in the States” to
abolish here? Will it not inevitably produce discon

tent and rebellion among the blacks of the neighbor*
ing States, and make this District a den of fugitive
slaves? Yes, sir, the truth cannot be suppressed,
that if slavery is touched here, a blow will be struck
which will be felt throughout the length and breadth
of the slave-holding States.
These suggestions, thrown out for the considera
tion of others, are but some of the difficulties which
have presented themselves to my mind, in the way
of any exercise of power over the subject of slavery
in this District; and I humbly ask that, if they are
not of sufficient weight to convince us of our want of
power over the subject, whether they are not calcu
lated at least to create doubts as to its possession?
And what, under such circumstances, has been held
the safe and unerring guide for the conduct of the le
gislator? It is, that if there be doubt as to the power,
it should not be exercised. Quod dubitas ne feceris. ■
What you doubt, that you may not do. The pos
session of power should be untrammelled by a single
doubt, or you should not attempt its exercise.
But (says the member from Maine, and it is reit
erated by the gentleman from New York and others)
separate the right of petition from abolition, and “see
how we will come up to the mark; how we will sus
tain our obligations to the Union.” Sir, the right of
petition and abolition ought never to have been
blended. -To connect them is a mere trick—an
artful scheme to excite the sympathies and delude
the judgments of this legislative body. And who,
pray, are the authors of this base trick? Who the
projectors of this artful scheme. Who connected
the right of petition with abolition? Are we at the
South, the slaveholding community, subject to the
charge? It will not be pretended. It will not be pre
sumed for a moment that we would throw any ob
stacles in the way, and create interference with the
maintenance of our just and constitutional rights.
Are our friends of the North, the anti-abolitionists,
chargeable? Surely not. They deprecate the diffi
culty; they pray deliverance from the embarrass
ment; and we have no reason to question their sin
cerity. If neither the South nor those opposed
to abolition in the North, are the authors of this
scheme, who are? There is but one other party in
the country upon this subject, and it results inevita
bly that they are its authors—viz: the abolitionists
themselves. I appeal to our intelligent and reflect
ingfriends from the North—I put it to them, wheth
er they will suffer themselves to be'5 thus entrapped;
caught in the snare set for- them by these fanatics;
deluded by this miserable subterfuge, the pitiful cry
of the violation of the right of petition. But it has
already been hinted, and I may be answered, that
though this may be but a trick, yet the abo
litionists have so fully succeeded in poisoning
the minds of our constituents, so thoroughly and
extensively have they persuaded them that the
non-reception of their petitions is a violation of
their unalienable rights, that unless we carry out
their views, the relation between us, of representa
tive and constituents, will be dissolved. Sir, such
a suggestion scarcely deserves a passing notice.
Any man who legislates here with a view to get
back into this hall, will of course riot be guided by
reason. Such a member is unworthy of his station,
because he legislates for himself, and. not for his coun
try. Their constituents think the iSight of petition
abridged, when we are daily receiving petition®
without objection, over which Congress has juris
diction, and reject only those over which Congres®
has no control. Cannot they understand the diffe
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rence between the abuse and use of an important the country? No one will deny the assertion. Are
right? The same amendment which guaranties our friends in the North willing to contribute to aothe right of petition, guaranties also freedom of eomplish the triumph of the enemies of the country;
speech and of the press; and because those rights and especially when their victory would be over the
are secured, is there therefore no such thing as constitution of the land, the liberties of the people?
slander or libel? If their constituents cannot now Sir, let me tell gentlemen of the North that on
be brought to understand the difference between a this subject there is no neutral ground. There are
proper and an improper petition, upon a subject of but two parties in this contest—the friends and the foes
■which Congress has cognizance, and one where it has of the constitution. They must take sides with one
no jurisdiction, how is- it proposed to make them or the other; and wherever their influence settles,
understand the difference between the rejection of victory must perch upon that banner. The whole
a petition and the rejection of the prayer of a peti responsibility is with the North. Let them not
tion? How can they be made to comprehend how it shrink from their high destiny; let them glory in
is that a petition is of so much consequence as to be the occasion; let them meet it like men; let them do
received, arid is yet, at the same time, of so little their -duty, and leave consequences to take care of
consequence as to be rejected? I trust that our themselves.
Sir, will gentlemen hesitate? Is this a time for
friends of the North will not suffer themselves to
be alarmed by the delusive cry of a “false issue” hesitation, when the government is agitated to its
Is this a time to cavil about
being made, or be deterred from pursuing their true very centre?
course for fear of consequences which do not and terms, when the foundations of the nation are
shaken? Is this a time to make hair-breadth
ought not legitimately to follow.
The gentleman from North Carolina lias attempt distinctions about the extent of rights, when our
ed to illustrate this matter of “false position,” by very days seem numbered? I tell gentlemen of
a “simile of a battle.” Let me tell the gentleman the North, the South is in danger; and will they
that he has himself assumed, in the outset, “false po hesitate? Was such the conduct of the South
sitions;” and, in some cases, false characters for his when the North was in danger—not from a feeble
parties in that battle. He represents a general to band of fanatics, but frqyi the most powerful nation
have taken a position with his own troops behind of the world? Sixty-eight years-ago, when the re
a secure breastwork; but has stationed his allies on port of the musketry at Lexington gave token of
exposed ground, where they are rapidly falling by the danger of our brethren of the North, a cargo of
the enemy’s fire. The secure breastwork is the powder was captured off Savannah, by Georgia en
constitution, I suppose.. But where, I ask, are terprise and Georgia valor. Was that ammunition,
the allies—where the exposed ground? Who are- at the time so scarce in the country, retained at
the contending parties in this engagement? The home to await the arrival of the enemy on our own
enemies and the friends of the constitution? shores, and to defend our own firesides? No sir; I
The gentleman can make no other answer. am proud to say, that with that disinterested pa
Who are the enemies? Of course the aboli triotism which has ever characterized the South, it
tionists. Who are the friends of the constitution? was immediately shipped to Boston, and it arrived
The anti-abolitionists. Where, then, are the allies? in time to thunder from the heights Of Bunker’s hill
Are the anti-abolitionists ofthe North any less the defiance to oppression.
enlisted soldiers and interested defenders of the con And in our late war, waged for “free trade and
stitution, than we at the South? Surely not. Where sailors’ rights,” did the South stop to inquire wheth
he exposed ground? We are behind the breast er the owners of the ships, or the impressed seamen,
work, (as the gentleman considers the constitution.) were natives of a southern latitude? No; it was
Have we pushed our friends of the North beyond that enough for them to know that the flag which had
constitution? or are they beyond, and in any exposed been dishonored, was the American flag; that the
situation? No, sir; we both stand together upon seaman who had been oppressed was an American
the same ground—the battlements of the constitu citizen; and they were at their posts, and ready to
tion. The enemy—the abolitionists—are alone with lose their last life drop for the protection of the one
out; they are ''striving to enter the citadel, sla and the defence of the other. •
very is the weak point in the fortress. It is there they Sir; the people of the South love the Union. They
design a breach. We have there constructed a venerate the constitution as the bond of that Union,
barrier: that barrier is the rule. Whilst that re and will be the last to engage in its infractions. But
mains, the fortress stands. When it is gone, the they love the constitution as it is; as it was con
fortress falls. That barrier can be removed only by strued by those who made it; as it has been ap
some one within. The fortress can be taken, the cita proved by near half a century’s successive legisla
del lost, only by treachery in the camp. I will pur tion-—sufficient for all the purposes of our govern
sue the simile, no farther. But let me tell the ment, and all the glory of our country. But now, if
member from North (Carolina, that if this rule is the North, regardless of the claims of the South,
lost, from the relation in which he stands to, and the will suffer that instrument violated—if the con
part which he has borne in this transaction, he may stitution, like the right of petition, is of so
go home to his constituents, and to his grave, cov much consequence as to be preserved when for
ered with the unenviable immortality of having be- their gratification, and, at the same time, of so little
rayed the interest of the South, in having sur consequence as to be violated when for our destruc
rendered the constitution of his country.
tion,—if the constitution is to be thus mutilated, de
, I hopdd to have had time to have commented pend upon it the South will not respect its mere frag
upon the motives of these abolitionists. But what ments, scattered in the struggle of other States to
ever they are—whether to destroy the institution of overthrow her institutions. If that hour should
slavery, or, by their petitions, only to annoy and insult come, (which God in his mercy avert!) she will hesi
the South—will not the rejection of this rule by the tate not to appeal from the cancelled obligations of a
House be to them a triumph? No one can dispute once-venerated constitution,- to her own “inherent
the point.1 Are not the abolitionists the enemies of and inalienable” right of self-protection.

